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Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and
Standard of Review for ERISA Disability Plans
Peter A. Meyers*
[Benefits] are too important these days for most employees
to want to place them at the mercy of a biased tribunal sub-
ject only to a narrow form of "arbitrary and capricious" re-
view, relying on the company's interest in its reputation to
prevent it from acting on its bias.'
-Richard Posner, U.S. District Court Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, the UnumProvident Corporation ("Unum"), the
largest disability insurer in the United States,2 signed a landmark agree-
ment with the insurance directors of Massachusetts, Maine, and Tennes-
see, and the United States Department of Labor.3 The Attorney General
of the State of New York, Elliot Spitzer, endorsed the agreement.4 The
agreement, made after Unum had lost several high-profile cases,5 calls
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1. Van Boxel v. The Journal Company Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1987).
2. Lisa Girion, Suit Says Insurer Wrongly Denied Disability Claims, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2004, at C 1.
3. Press Release, Maine Bureau of Insurance, Multi-State Settlement Addresses Concerns
Regarding Unum-Provident Claims Handling (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.state.me.us/pfr/press/
ins unumsettlement.htm (last modified Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Multi-State Settlement Ad-
dresses Concerns].
4. Id.
5. See Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-0015 JSL, 1997 U.S. Dist. WL 906146,
at * 11-13 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 1997) (bad faith "suspension" of disability benefits used as attempted
strategy to settle for substantially less than the amount owed); Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins.
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for sweeping changes in the way Unum and the companies it owns 6 han-
dle disability insurance claims. In part, the agreement consisted of a $140
million settlement and a $15 million penalty against Unum. 7 Most impor-
tantly, Unum agreed to reexamine more than 200,000 claims 8 it denied
since January 1, 1997, to institute new claims handling procedures and
benefit determination practices, to improve accountability and oversight,
and to enhance its own corporate governance. 9 Forty other states have
signed on to the agreement.'0 If Unum fails to improve its practices in
accord with the agreements, an additional $145 million fine will be im-posed. I f
Many of the disability policies that Unum sells find their way into
employer-sponsored benefit packages covered by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 12 Under ERISA, Unum is a
fiduciary with a conflict of interest because it both determines the fact of
a claimant's disability and pays out of its own purse to resolve claims. 13
Co. of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 n.20 (2004) (citing numerous circuit decisions to show pattern
of erroneous and arbitrary denials, bad faith contract interpretations, and other unscrupulous prac-
tices). Things have been bad for Unum lately, and a sampling of headlines shows how bad: Dateline
NBC Airs Allegations Against UnumProvident (Oct. 2002); Class Action Lawsuit Filed In New
York Against UnumProvident (Nov. 2002); Judge Upholds $7.67 Million Award Against Insurer
(Nov. 2002); Japan Penali[z]es Unit of UnumProvident (Jan. 2003); Calif. Jury Orders UnumProvi-
dent to Pay Policyholder $31.7 Million (Jan. 2003); Second Class Action Lawsuit Brought Against
UnumProvident (Feb. 2003) (alleged securities violations); Hundreds Sue Largest Disability Insurer
(Mar. 2003); UnumProvident Fined $1 Million By Georgia (Mar. 2003) UnumProvident Hit with
$84.5M Verdict (Apr. 2003) (Arizona lawsuit); Manhattan Judge Declines to Dismiss Suit Against
UnumProvident, Chandler (Apr. 2003); UnumProvident Loses Court Ruling (July 2003); Suit Says
Insurer Wrongly Denied Disability Claims (Apr. 2004) (whistleblower suit under ERISA); Unum-
Provident Gets Subpoena from New York (Aug. 2004); Spitzer Subpoenas Large Insurers in Probe
(Oct. 2004); UnumProvident Shareholder Sues Officers, Directors (Jan. 2005), http://
www.yourlawyer.com/practice/news.htm?topic=Unum%20Provident%20Fraud (last visited Mar. 20,
2005).
6. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, First
Unum Life Insurance Company, and Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company.
http://www.unum.com/aboutus/ourcompanies/upbrandedcompanies.aspx (list of companies) (last
visited Jan. 16, 2005).
7. Press Release, Maine Bureau of Insurance, Landmark Multi-State Settlement Takes Effect;
National Remedy Grants Claims Review for Thousands (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.
state.me.us/pfr/press/insUnumProvidentsettlement.htm (last modified Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Landmark Multi-State Settlement Takes Effect].
8. At a cost of $120 million. Multi-State Settlement Addresses Concerns, supra note 3.
9. Landmark Multi-State Settlement Takes Effect, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. "The terms 'employee welfare benefit plan' and 'welfare plan' mean any plan.., which..
is ... maintained by an employer.., to the extent that such plan ... is maintained for the purpose
of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise
... disability... benefits... " 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A) (2004) (emphasis added). Church plans and
governmental plans are exempt from ERISA. § 1003(b)(I)-(2).
13. See infra Part III.D.
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Additionally, Unum probably has language in each of its disability poli-
cies that gives it discretion to construe the terms of its policies and de-
cide which claimants get paid. Because Unum is a fiduciary exercising
discretion, under current ERISA jurisprudence, its reasons for denying a
disability claim are reviewed at the district court level only for an abuse
of that discretion. 14
The Unum settlement exposed Unum's claim denial practices that,
because of generally limited discovery, ordinarily would not come to
light in a disability claim in federal court under ERISA."5 The settlement
showed the lengths to which a conflicted fiduciary would go in order to
benefit its own bottom line over the needs of disabled employee-
beneficiaries. If the Unum settlement had been an ERISA case that had
been reviewed de novo, additional discovery could take place that would
take a plaintiff beyond the record to search for evidence of such denial
practices. 16
In most circuits, however, evidence of abusive practices will not
come to light; so long as the plan document explicitly gives the fiduciary
discretion to make benefit determinations, courts ordinarily must defer to
the fiduciary's decisions. 17 Because discretionary clauses can hide the
kind of abuse seen in the Unum settlement, in order to remedy the plight
of employees who have obtained bargained-for benefits under ERISA, all
ERISA fiduciaries that are also insurance companies should be deemed
to have an inherent conflict of interest. Federal courts reviewing these
conflicted decisions should then apply a "presumptively void" rule to the
conflicted decision, necessitating de novo review.'8 Broad discovery then
should be granted under de novo review in order to search for a fiduci-
ary's actual conflict of interest. This approach would help employee-
beneficiaries recover benefits due them under the plan free of the conflict
of interest.
Part II of this article will introduce the reader to disability insur-
ance. Part III will examine how ERISA is a mixture of different law and
how that mixture led to discretionary clauses being inserted and the re-
14. See infra text accompanying note 29.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. For example, when an insurance company provides financial rewards as an incentive to
claims representatives to improve financial results, and terminating a plaintiff's claim would save
forty percent of the projected revenue shortfall, clearly, the conflict of interest determines more than
just standard of review. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion for Limited Remand to the District Court to
Allow Full Consideration of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Motion Based on Newly Discovered Evidence,
Feibusch v. Integrated Device Tech., Inc. Employee Benefit Plan (9th Cir. 2005) (No. CV-03-00265-
SOM).
17. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
18. Although this analysis would apply with equal force to ERISA health insurance plans, only
ERISA disability plans will be examined in this Comment.
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suiting severe conflicts of interest. Part IV will look at Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the seminal ERISA case on conflicts of interest.
Part V will examine the contributions that the Ninth Circuit has made to
ERISA conflict of interest law. Part VI will treat scope of review and
discovery and Part VII will conclude that insurers should be strictly regu-
lated in ERISA plans.
II. ERISA DISABILITY BASICS
Disability insurance is designed to be replacement income for an
employee when illness or injury makes it difficult or impossible to work,
and is one type of insurance that is frequently part of an employee's
compensation package. The administration of such a plan is regulated by
ERISA if the plan "was established or maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise . . . disability. . . benefits .... 1,9 If the employee
then gets disabled such that he or she cannot work, the payments from
the insurance company can often constitute a major portion of the em-
ployee's income. Disability insurance is an eminently compassionate
way for an employer to treat its employees. If an employee is totally dis-
abled and cannot work at any occupation, he is useless to an employer.
When determining the fact of an employee's disability, the plan
administrator 20 examines the so-called administrative record that the ad-
ministrator itself has compiled. The employee submits an initial disabil-
ity claim to the administrator, who has the discretion to request doctors'
reports, opinions, and other medical evidence to show whether the em-
ployee can perform certain tasks essential to his job. Often, the employee
will do job-performance studies and work studies with a specialist, re-
ports of which, when combined with reports from the employee's treat-
ing physician, form the basis of the administrative record. In addition to
the employee's treating physician, the administrator also has the option
of independently examining the claimant with its own medical personnel.
If the plan document has granted discretion to the administrator, the ad-
ministrator holds ultimate power to make decisions, based on the record,
on whether the employee is disabled. The employee can ask for further
review if at first denied, but once the internal review process is ex-
19.29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(A) (2004).
20. Administrators, fiduciaries, and trustees are all creatures of ERISA and are vested with
fiduciary powers. See §§ 1102(c)(1), 1002(21)(A). Generally, "fiduciary" will be used in this Com-
ment to refer to the entity exercising fiduciary power.
[Vol. 28:467
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hausted,2' the employee must make out a complaint against the insurer or
the plan itself in federal court under ERISA.
Although ERISA sets out causes of action and remedies for partici-
pants and beneficiaries of benefit plans, 22 the statute is silent on the judi-
cial standard of review to be applied to fiduciaries' decisions; 23 this has
lead to wide discrepancies in courts' treatment of challenged disability
plans. Before the landmark Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch deci-
sion, courts typically borrowed the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
from labor law 4 or used contract law's de novo review.25 Trust law was
also a natural choice because of the fiduciary duties involved. Since the
funding vehicles in ERISA disability plans are often insurance contracts,
state insurance law was relevant as well. In other words, no single body
of law could be called upon to adjudicate ERISA cases.
26
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, which set a de novo standard of review for ERISA
fiduciaries' decisions to deny benefits.27 Unless the terms of the plan
document give the fiduciary discretion to make eligibility decisions or to
construe the terms of the plan, the standard of review is de novo.28 If an
21. § 1133 requires plans to provide claimants with notice of claim denial, with specific rea-
sons for the denial, and to afford claimants a reasonable opportunity for a "full and fair review" by
the plan fiduciary.
22. The typical cause of action under § 1132(a)(l)(B) is brought to "recover benefits due to
him ... to enforce his rights ... or to clarify his rights to future benefits .... Note the mix of legal
and declaratory relief. Two other causes of action are available, one for breach of fiduciary duty by
the fiduciary, § 1132(a)(2), and one as a catch-all equitable remedy, § 1132(a)(3). However, the
United States Supreme Court has stringently limited the scope of remedies to ERISA's civil en-
forcement scheme. See, e.g., Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2499-2500 (2004) (pre-
cluding other extracontractual recovery); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 221 (2002) (precluding monetary damages); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52
(1987) (precluding state bad faith claims for improper processing of a claim for benefits).
23. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) ("ERISA does not set
out the appropriate standard of review for actions . . . challenging benefit eligibility determina-
tions.").
24. See, e.g., id. at 109-10. Federal courts had adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard as
a way of asserting jurisdiction over suits under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") by
beneficiaries of LMRA plans who were denied benefits by trustees. But since ERISA authorizes
suits against trustees, the jurisdictional basis for the arbitrary and capricious standard falls away and
yields to the trust law abuse of discretion standard. Id.
25. See Matthews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998). The problem with
using contract law is that rarely is one party granted the power to interpret and define the terms of a
unilateral contract-which is what the plan document amounts to-such that the other party is
bound.
26. An excellent survey of ERISA cases can be found in Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Stan-
dard of Review in ERISA Benefit Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1096-108 (2001).
27. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
28. Id. Furthermore, de novo review is applicable whether the plan is funded or unfunded, and
whether the fiduciary is operating under a potential or actual conflict of interest. Id. See also infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
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employee can obtain de novo review, discovery can take place outside
the administrative record and that evidence can be admitted. If a fiduci-
ary has drafted discretionary authority into the plan document, however,
a court will review the fiduciary's decision only for an abuse of that dis-
cretion and will not inquire beyond the record z9
As important as discretionary authority is to an abuse of discretion
analysis, any fiduciary that operates under a conflict of interest 30 will
find that conflict also weighed by the reviewing court.31 The federal cir-
cuits have weighed conflicts into their standard of review analyses in at
least seven different ways.32 The problem, however, is that conflicts are
not properly weighed because, in an abuse of discretion analysis that
looks at the record alone, conflicts that are not evident in the record can-
not be properly examined.3 3 Agreements such as the Unum settlement
should make the rest of the circuits more willing to adopt the Ninth Cir-
cuit's "presumptively void" standard in order to apply de novo review
when the insurer of an ERISA disability plan is also its fiduciary.
During the multi-state market conduct investigation that led to the
Unum settlement, it became clear that what Unum had been doing only
scratches the surface of what is wrong with the state of disability insur-
ance, and highlights why courts should apply a de novo review standard
more often. Unum relied excessively on the opinions of in-house medical
professionals rather than using an independent medical examiner
("IME");34 when it did use the report of an IME or an employee's attend-
ing physician, its own medical professionals' bias resulted in miscon-
struction of the IME's or attending physician's reports. 35 Unum also
failed to evaluate the totality of the claimant's medical picture by not
properly considering comorbid 36 conditions that give rise to the disabil-
ity, and by inappropriately placing the burden on claimants to justify
their eligibility for benefits, such as imposing a requirement on the in-
29. See Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993).
30. See infra notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text.
31. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
32. See infra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 135 and 136 and accompanying text.
34. See Report of the Targeted Multistate Market Conduct Examination: Maine Bureau of
Insurance, Massachusetts Division of Insurance, Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
and Forty-Nine Participating Jurisdictions of Unum Life Insurance Company of America, The Paul
Revere Life Insurance Company and Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company,
http://www.state.me.us/pfr/ins/UnumMultistateExamReport.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter Report of the Targeted Multistate Market Conduct Examination].
35. Id.
36. Comorbidity is "[tlhe presence of coexisting or additional diseases with reference to an
initial diagnosis or with reference to the index condition that is the subject of study." THE
CANCERWEB PROJECT, ON-LINE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE,
at http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/omd (last visited March 24, 2005).
[Vol. 28:467
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sured to submit objective proof of disability even though the policy con-
tained no such requirement.
37
Ill. THE ORIGINS OF ERISA & ITS ODD DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Genesis of ERISA
In 1963, the Studebaker-Packard Corporation went bankrupt and
could not afford to fully fund its pension plan.38 Consequently, employ-
ees under the age of sixty, some of whom had spent their entire lives
working for Studebaker, received lump-sum payments of about fifteen
percent of the value of their pensions. 39 What happened to these unfortu-
nate Studebaker employees kindled public outcry and congressional
hearings that resulted in ERISA.4 °
B. Trust Law Not Uniformly Applied
ERISA legislation overcame the conflicting interests of employees
and employers, unions and management, and the Treasury Department
and the Labor Department to become an incomplete body of law.41 It was
incomplete because Congress contemplated that the federal court system
would develop a federal common law. 42 Federal common law was re-
quired because ERISA expressly preempts most state laws regarding
37. See Report of the Targeted Multistate Market Conduct Examination, supra note 34.
38. James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business ": The Studebaker-
Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683-84 (2001).
39. Id. at 731.
40. See Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private Pension Plan
Reform Movement, in PENSION & EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68 (John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk
eds., 3d ed. 2000); DENNIS E. LOGUE & JACK S. RADER, MANAGING PENSION PLANS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO IMPROVING PLAN PERFORMANCE 71 (1998).
41. JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTSHELL 71-74 (1993). ERISA reflects
the two different types of legislation of which it consists: the labor bills and the tax bills. The labor
bills emphasized employee benefit expectation and were largely adopted with enforcement authority
vested in the Secretary of Labor. See also 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(2), (4)-(6), (8)-(9) (2004). The tax
bills were also adopted, but primarily as encouragement for the employers to adopt plans. The statute
also overcame a late charge from some business interests intent on killing the legislation.
42. See S. REP. NO. 4904, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.:
It is necessary to take into account additional costs from the standpoint of the employer.
If employers respond to more comprehensive coverage, vesting and funding rules by de-
creasing benefits under existing plans or slowing the rate of formation of new plans, little
if anything would be gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee
pensions and related plans.
Id. See also 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[l]t is also intended that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
55-56 (1987) (comparing ERISA with the LMRA to show that state law remedies were contem-
plated by the drafters of ERISA).
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benefit plans.43 Federal common law at the circuit level has since flour-
ished,44 but even with the United States Supreme Court hearing about
two benefit cases per term, the Court has not made consistent ERISA
law. Part of the problem is that the statute itself encourages inconsistency
because it grants discretion to conflicted fiduciaries.
Under ERISA, the fiduciary is central.45 The fiduciary is responsi-
ble for managing plan assets, determining eligibility for plan benefits,
and construing plan terms.46 A fiduciary is required because Congress
contemplated that ERISA funds would be held in trust,47 thus ensuring
protection of those funds should a business dissolve, as happened to
Studebaker. A fiduciary can entrust its duties to others, 48 and employer-
fiduciaries frequently do just that when they outsource the administration
and the funding of the disability plan to an insurance company.49
In trust law, the settlor of a trust may confer broad discretionary
powers on a trustee, and a court generally will not substitute its own
judgment for that of a trustee's when the trustee is acting pursuant to
such a grant of power. 50 Under ERISA, however, a person becomes a
43. See § 1144(a); Bast v. Prudential, 150 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998). ERISA does not
preempt state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities law, but it does prevent states from
construing benefit plans as insurers, banks, or investment companies. § 1144(b)(2)(A). See also §
1144(b)(2)(B) for the following:
Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies.
Where ERISA is silent, state laws could be used as gap fillers. Since New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), however, courts have
been more willing to find state laws not preempted. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. &
Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dil-
lingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 319 (1997).
44. For example, the circuits have been busy developing rules for treating conflicts of interest.
See infra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
45. See § 1002(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he exer-
cises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management ... or disposition
of its assets .... ).
46. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (fiduciary with plan-
granted discretionary authority can construe terms of plan).
47. See § 1103(a) ("[A]II assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust ... .
48. §§ 1102 (a)(2)(A), 105(c)(l)(B).
49. See § 1002(l)(A). "Through the purchase of insurance or otherwise . Id. If an em-
ployer self-insures a short-term disability plan without establishing a trust, the plan is likely to be a
"payroll practice" not subject to ERISA because of 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1(b)(2) (2005) (stating that
"employee welfare benefit plan" does not include payment to employee, out of employer's general
assets, when employee is physically or mentally unable to perform job).
50. See, e.g., Stratton v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 363 F.3d 250, 253 (2004) (holding
that a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the administrator's when the court is
reviewing under a deferential or heightened arbitrary and capricious standard). Note that this is a
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fiduciary whenever that person exercises any discretionary authority or
control. 5' The difference between trust law and ERISA law is thus enor-
mous: Under ERISA, a person can be a fiduciary and can exercise trus-
tee-like authority whenever he or she exercises any trust management
powers, even though the express or implied grant of authority ordinarily
required under trust law is absent.
Because ERISA fiduciaries do not need a grant of power, using
trust law to adjudicate ERISA disability cases poses two major problems.
First, it is a foreign concept to trust law that a fiduciary becomes a fidu-
ciary because of the function that he or she performs. Settlors name trus-
tees under trust law; trustees do not simply arise because they act like
trustees. ERISA has thus expanded the scope of liability by broadening
the definition of a trustee.5 2
Second, although a trust will not fail for lack of a trustee, a trustee
will fail for lack of a trust. Thus, when plan assets are not held in trust,
they are not under a trustee's authority, yet the trustee's decisions still
get deference, even though the rationale for such deference has dropped
out.53
For example, treatment of insurance contracts are exceptions to the
ERISA rule that plan assets must be held in trust.54 Because insurance
contracts do not fall under ERISA's trust requirements, disability insur-
ance contracts thus raise special concerns insofar as deference is con-
cerned. If a court used only trust law when evaluating a disability insur-
ance claim, it would have to conclude that no trust means no trustee, and
no trustee means no deference. While some courts understand the unique
suspension of trust law as applied to ERISA and insurance companies,
55
many others prove themselves unable to properly apply the needed law.
C. Problems with Discretionary Language
ERISA jurisprudence is problematic both because insurance con-
tracts do not fall under ERISA's trust requirements and because fiduciar-
basic question in level-of-review analysis in administrative law. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of an administrative agency).
51. § 1002(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control .....
52. See KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 1107.
53. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1990) (noting
that since "[t]he basis for the deferential standard of review in the first place was the trust nature of
most ERISA plans, the most important reason for deferential review is lacking." (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
54. § 1103(b)(1) ("The requirements... shall not apply to any assets of a plan which consist of
insurance contracts or policies issued by an insurance company qualified to do business in a State.").
55. E.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000).
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ies of insurance-funded plans have nearly unbridled discretionary author-
ity.
As the fiduciary is central to ERISA, so discretionary authority is
central to the fiduciary. Discretionary power defines the fiduciary's rela-
tionship to the plan and its participants, 56 letting ERISA fiduciaries con-
trol plan assets57 decide who qualifies for benefits, and construe the
terms of the trust. 58
Discretionary authority is not ordinarily a problem, and indeed,
granting discretion to fiduciaries has many benefits. Without discretion,
plan assets might not be managed responsibly and fiduciaries might not
be able to resolve claims in the cost-effective manner envisioned as a
major policy goal of ERISA. 59 Fiduciaries need discretion to deny un-
worthy claims that, if paid, would unfairly reduce benefits to all other
participants and would thus violate ERISA's exclusive benefit rule.
60
Fiduciaries are also in the best position to construe the terms of their par-
ticular plans because they are accustomed to operating under the terms of
their plans. Furthermore, employers as fiduciaries are motivated to treat
beneficiaries fairly and to avoid getting a reputation for sharp dealing,
which, among other negatives, would reduce morale among workers. 61
Finally, if employer-fiduciaries did not have discretion to control plan
costs, fewer would offer plans to employees. 62
Yet plan terms that confer discretionary power upon a fiduciary are
often detrimental to disability claimants because, with unfettered discre-
tion to deny benefits unilaterally, fiduciaries can turn disability contracts
into contracts of adhesion. A contract is not rooted in bilateralism when
one party dictates the terms. 6 3 Basic procedural safeguards are missing
when ERISA claims are "adjudicated" by conflicted fiduciaries who are
56. § 1002(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management ... or disposition of its
assets .... "). Every plan document must name a fiduciary. § 1102(a).
57. See § 1103(a).
58. As long as such discretion is written into the plan. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review will be
applied if the plan document confers discretionary authority upon the fiduciary). See Libbey-Owens-
Ford Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that
when an insurance company has authority to grant or deny such claims, the insurance company has
discretionary authority).
59. See § 100lb(c)(5) ("[T]o maintain the premium costs of such system[s] at a reasonable
level .... ).
60. See § I 103(c)(1).
61. John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 216 (1990).
62. Id.
63. See Jay Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28




less-than-impartial arbiters. Disability claimants must first exhaust the
fiduciary's review process before they can bring a suit in federal court,
and even then a federal judge will be reviewing the administrator's deci-
sion only for abuse of discretion. 64 Add a conflicted fiduciary and dis-
ability claimants face a tough go.
An insurance company will frequently act as fiduciary, a fearsome
creature because it lacks the reputational incentive that employers have
to avoid sharp dealing with employees. An insurer's incentive is to keep
the employer as a customer, and it does that by keeping costs down, re-
sulting in denied claims. When a claim is denied, employers are insulated
from employees' ire by the insurer. If it is true that an employer-
fiduciary's reputational interest wanes as the employment relationship
dissolves, 65 the insurer-fiduciary may be one of the least motivated crea-
tures in the legal world. If the insurer-fiduciary cannot even muster the
motivation to avoid sharp dealing when dealing with ex-employees, one
can only guess as to its other lackluster interests.
Given the conflict of interest inherent in an insurance company act-
ing as a fiduciary, discretionary language in disability insurance contracts
is, not surprisingly, under heavy attack. In February 2004, citing state
law,66 the California Department of Insurance began voiding disability
insurance contracts that contain discretionary terms. 67 Pursuant to this
action, the Department has withdrawn its previous approval from disabil-
ity form contracts that contain discretionary terms. 68 California is taking
a distinctly contractual approach to the problem of discretionary terms,
69
and Bruch does not speak to the enforceability, under state insurance
law, of discretionary terms; Bruch only sets the standard of review for
64. "[T]he practical effect of allowing discretionary clauses in insurance policies is contrary to
every principle of insurance law and civil procedure developed over the past 100 years." Committee
on Consumer Protection, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, (Dec. 8, 2003) at http://www.naic.org/
govemment relations/healthpolicy/docs/DeBofskyTESTIMONY.doc (testimony of Mark D.
DeBofsky).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 102-103.
66. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10291.5(f), 12957 (2005).
67. Letter Opinion from Gary M. Cohen, General Counsel, State of California Department of
Insurance, to Teresa S. Renaker, Esq., Lewis and Feinberg, P.C. (Feb. 26, 2004) at 1,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/LGL/Letter-Opinion-per-CIC- 12921-9-Discretionary-Clauses.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005) ("[A]II such discretionary clauses in disability insurance contracts violate
California law and deprive insureds of protections to which they are entitled .... ").
68. Memorandum Notice to Withdraw Approval and Order for Information from John Gara-
mendi, California Insurance Commission, to All Disability Insurers Doing Business in California
(Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Legal.htm (withdrawing any approval of any
disability forms known to contain discretionary clauses).
69. Id. ("Although the contract contains the insurer's promise to pay benefits under the stated
conditions, the discretionary clause makes those payments contingent on the unfettered discretion of
the insurer, thereby nullifying the promise to pay and rendering the contract potentially illusory.").
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those plans that do have discretionary terms. Recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions on insurance contracts and ERISA preemption
have affirmed this, 70 the Court reasoning that ERISA's savings clause 7'
entrusts the states with the regulation of insurance and thus state laws
that mandate insurance contract terms are saved from ERISA's preemp-
tion provisions. 72 The lack of preemption of state insurance laws govern-
ing discretionary clauses and ERISA's lack of a trust requirement for
insurance contracts means that little stands in the way of continued in-
validation of discretionary language by state insurance commissioners.
The mounting attack upon discretionary language followed a 2002
announcement by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
("NAIC") that it had adopted the "Prohibition on the Use of Discretion-
ary Clauses Model Act,,7 3 aimed at health insurers. A similar model act,
aimed at disability insurers, was recently approved by the NAIC.74
To further understand why discretionary language is so bad for
ERISA beneficiaries, we must understand how ERISA has actually pro-
vided for conflicted fiduciaries.
D. Conflicts of Interest
An ERISA fiduciary's relationship with plan participants is at the
heart of much of ERISA jurisprudence. ERISA fiduciaries are supposed
to act exclusively for the benefit of a trust's beneficiaries7 5 because of the
76duty of loyalty under trust law. 6 If a fiduciary's interest conflicts with a
beneficiary's interest, the fiduciary is to consider the beneficiary's inter-
est alone, else a conflict of interest exists. If the fiduciary is conflicted,
70. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386 (2002) for the following:
Nothing in ERISA, however, requires that these kinds of decisions be so "discretionary"
in the first place; whether they are is simply a matter of plan design or the drafting of an
[insurance] contract .... [State statutes] prohibit[] designing an insurance contract so as
to accord unfettered discretion to the insurer to interpret the contract's terms.
See also Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004) (holding that a denial of benefits
under ERISA-regulated benefit plans is removable to federal district court).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004) (ERISA supersedes any and all state laws insofar as they relate
to any employee benefit plan).
72. See, e.g., Unum v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 375 (1999) (holding that state laws mandating
insurance contract terms are saved from preemption under § 11 44(b)(2)(A)).
73. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, NAIC Members Adopt Discretionary Clause
Model Act (June 9, 2002), http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/reI02/061002adoption of
discretionary.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
74. See PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT (Nat'l Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs, Draft, July 8, 2004), http://www.naic.org/modelspapers/models/models.htm (last
visited Dec. 27, 2004).
75. §§ I I03(c)(1), I I04(a)(1). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1992)
(trustee is under a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (trustee is under a duty to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries).
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the possibility exists that the fiduciary's self-interest will enter into the
decision to deny benefits; if this denial unduly profits the fiduciary, and
if a breach of loyalty occurs, a court will face a problematic calculation
in determining how much deference it should grant the conflicted fiduci-
ary's denial decision.
Conflicts of interest typically happen in three circumstances: (1) An
employer of an unfunded plan 77 is the fiduciary; (2) an insurer in a pay-
as-you-go plan is the fiduciary; and (3) an internal benefits committee on
the employer's side is the fiduciary. Any benefit denial obviously re-
duces the cost of benefits under the plan. Herein lies the conflict: An em-
ployer or insurer must be concerned about its bottom line and cannot
both fund the plan and fairly determine benefits. Such an arrangement is,
in the majority of the circuits, a presumptive or inherent conflict of inter-
est.78 Instead of asking whether a meaningful review of disability claims
is even possible when employer or insurer that stands to lose money if it
pays the claim is the same party that has the discretion to pay the claim,
ERISA law has simply continued with this uneasy alloy. Unfortunately,
federal courts have dealt with the problem of review by conceding to the
employer's interests.79
The passage of ERISA in 1974 signaled a congressional concession
to employers' interests. Congress, it seems, actually expected conflicted
fiduciaries to be running plans; 80 if employer fiduciaries could not run
plans, plans would be fewer and benefits lower. 8' Yet ERISA does not
say how much of a conflict or what kind of a conflict would be required
for a court to adjust (if at all) the level of deference it affords a conflicted
fiduciary's denial decision. It is in dealing with conflicted fiduciaries,
whether employer-fiduciaries of self-funded plans or insurer-fiduciaries
77. An unfunded, or pay-as-you-go, plan is one where assets are put into the plan on a demand
basis.
78. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2000)
(heightened form of arbitrary and capricious standard of review required when an insurance com-
pany both funds and administers benefits because of potential self-dealing); Lang v. Long-Term
Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., 125 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) for the statement
that "[b]ecause an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather than the
assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a business").
Any other arrangement, such as if the administrator is the insurance company while the employer is
the funding source, see Brown 898 F.2d at 1561, or vice versa, would not be an inherent conflict of
interest.
79. For an analysis of the employers' and employees' interests involved, see John H. Langbein
& Daniel Fischel, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1105, 1119-25 (1988).
80. See § 1102(c) (any person may serve in more than one fiduciary capacity, including service
both as trustee and as administrator).
81. Langbein, supra note 61, at 213.
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of insurance plans, that ERISA left a gap that the federal courts have
struggled to fill. As we will see, that gap was at best inexpertly filled by
Bruch.
IV. BRUCH: WHY IT WAS SEMINAL AND WHAT IT HAS
MEANT FOR ERISA JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Elevation of Discretionary Language
Discretionary language in ERISA plans, though well intentioned,
turned out to be very negative for employers. Though Bruch seems to
have advanced the interests of employees by subjecting benefit denials to
de novo review and by forcing fiduciaries to explicitly craft language
into plans before exercising discretion, the result was a narrowing of em-
ployee benefits. By so elevating discretionary language, Bruch walled off
a search for conflicts of interest.
Recall the standard of review from Bruch: A fiduciary's decision to
deny benefits will be reviewed by a federal judge de novo unless the plan
grants the fiduciary discretion to determine eligibility for benefits or con-
strue the terms of the plan.8 2 Prior to this, the old arbitrary and capricious
standard from labor law had been functioning well as a standard of re-
view without specific plan terms granting discretion. Under that stan-
dard, a plan fiduciary could deny benefits to an employee as long as the
fiduciary was not acting arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the claim
for benefits. It remains unknown why the Bruch court thought it neces-
sary to change this standard so radically by making the standard de novo.
After all, some courts were responsive in applying a more stringent stan-
dard when they saw evidence that a fiduciary's decisions were less than
impartial8 3 The Bruch court did not need to impose an entirely new
framework for formulating a standard of review in benefit denial situa-
tions.
1. Plan-Granted Discretion
Justice O'Connor, who authored the unanimous Bruch opinion,
wrote at length about the importance of trust law when dealing with
ERISA questions, particularly as to the fiduciary's power to construe the
82. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
83. See Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th
Cir. 1987) (applying a sliding scale of deference); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F. 2d 708, 711-12 (9th
Cir. 1985) (applying the same sliding scale of deference); see also ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 227, 228 (Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., 1991).
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terms of the plan. 84 Referring to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, she
explained that a fiduciary's discretion to exercise powers is not subject to
the control of the court, except to prevent an abuse of that discretion. 85
So far, so good; this is the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard. Yet
then she takes a hard right turn in her trust law analysis: Courts are to
defer to fiduciaries' decisions, she says, "[I]n the exercise of a discretion
vested in them by the instrument under which they act. 86 This is a subtle
but powerful move. The plan document has gone from being a source of
terms guiding the grant of discretion to being the font of discretion itself.
If the font does not allow discretion, the ERISA fiduciary has no discre-
tion, and benefit denial decisions will be reviewed accordingly--de
novo.
ERISA, paradoxically, nevertheless granted that discretion with the
following: "[T]he trustee ...shall have exclusive authority and discre-
tion to manage and control the assets of the plan. 87 ERISA's "func-
tional" approach to defining a fiduciary seems, additionally, to have
granted discretion by describing a "fiduciary" as anyone who exercises
"discretionary authority or . . . control" with respect to the plan.88 Yet
Justice O'Connor's opinion now restricts discretionary powers to what
the text of the plan document confers, 89 rather than referring to ERISA's
text or the fiduciary rules already being used in trust law.90
84. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112 (citing G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (2d
rev. ed. 1980), 3 W. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed. 1988), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS (1959)).
85. Id. at 111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1992) (a court is not to
intervene in a fiduciary's decisions where the fiduciary has had discretionary power conferred upon
it, except to prevent an abuse of that discretion).
86. Id. (quoting Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1875).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2004).
88. § 1002 (21)(A)(i). See also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
89. The test for plan-granted discretion has become extremely formalistic. See, e.g., Mizzell v.
Paul Revere Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (memorandum of decision re-
garding standard of review and related issues stating that plan documents must "unambiguously say
in sum or substance that the Plan Administrator or fiduciary has authority, power, or discretion to
determine eligibility or to construe the terms of the Plan ....").
90. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. Another commentator has made the argument more clearly that an
express grant of discretionary authority in a plan document is not required by the very section of the
Restatement from which Justice O'Connor was working. Langbein, supra note 61, at 219. "The
exercise ofa power is discretionary except to the extent to which its exercise is required by the terms
of the trust or by the principles of law applicable to the duties of trustees." Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, § 187 cmt. a (emphasis added). Thus, after Bruch, to go from an abuse of discretion standard
to a de novo standard just because ten words of boilerplate are missing violates trust law. See also
Langbein & Fischel, supra note 79, at 1114-17 (arguing that fiduciary rules restrict discretion).
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2. The Elevation of Plan-Granted Discretion
If discretion is now both required by and restricted to the plan
document, the Court has narrowed the idea of ERISA discretion by
throwing out the two fonts of discretion already used, fiduciary rules and
the statute itself. In effect, the Court has elevated discretionary plan lan-
guage to be the primary, if not the sole, font of discretion, rather than
making the plan language a restraint on discretion. The Court did not
stop there. When Justice O'Connor used the Restatement, she should
have looked at the same section from which she plucked her other trust
principles, namely, section 187, a section that puts her text-granted dis-
cretion on the same footing as conflicts of interest. Comment d to section
18791 is a list of "circumstances [that] may be relevant" to a court when
determining whether a fiduciary has abused its discretion. One of those
circumstances is the extent of discretion conferred upon a trustee by the
terms of the trust; another is whether the fiduciary has an interest that
conflicts with beneficiaries' interests.
Though both of these circumstances demand consideration, the
Bruch Court has elevated but one of them to dispositive weight: "Of
course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary
who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be
weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discre-
tion.' ' 92 Fiduciaries can now easily ensure that their acts will be ad-
judged under an abuse of discretion standard simply by adding a line or
two of boilerplate to every plan they oversee. In an abuse of discretion
review, only the administrative record is ever reviewed.93 If only the re-
cord is reviewed in isolation-that is, without the factors such as those in
Comment d-evidence about conflicts will likely remain hidden, espe-
cially when it comes to the structural conflicts that insurer-fiduciaries
routinely experience.
Thus, by elevating the textual grant of discretion above the other
Comment d factors, the Court has functionally stated that a conflict of
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1992). Comment d states the following:
In determining the question whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of discretion in exer-
cising or failing to exercise a power, the following circumstances may be relevant: (1) the
extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the trust; (2) the pur-
poses of the trust; (3) the nature of the power; (4) the existence or nonexistence, the defi-
niteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the
trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining
from exercising the power; (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee
conflicting with that of the beneficiaries.
Id.
92. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS, § 187, cmt. d. (1959)).
93. Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993).
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interest is no longer an independent factor of equal weight with a textual
grant of discretion. At the same time, the textual grant makes abuse of
discretion review easier to obtain simply by adding boilerplate language;
it is thus easy to confine the conflict of interest inquiry to the administra-
tive record. Such undetected (and undetectable) conflicts can harm
employees' interests as beneficiaries because the conflicts are simply not
properly weighed in ERISA standard of review analysis. And insurer-
fiduciaries that are inherently conflicted because of their financial incen-
tives and motivated toward sharp practices are especially potent sources
of undetected conflicts.
Justice O'Connor gave insurer-fiduciaries an additional boost when
she said that the analysis does not hinge on whether or not the plan is
funded.94 As long as the text of the plan grants discretion, the fiduciaries
of unfunded, pay-as-you-go plans can make the same kinds of fiduciary
decisions even though there is no corpus to protect. Just a bit of boiler-
plate will give conflicted fiduciaries of unfunded plans complete discre-
tion to deny claims.
This freedom of discretion is but one of myriad points where fed-
eral common law on ERISA has departed from a consistent approach to
identifying interests in the employment context, and again demonstrates
how ERISA trusts are fundamentally different from gratuitous trusts.95
Insurer-fiduciaries are insulated doctrinally from a searching conflicts
analysis because the easily obtained abuse of discretion standard pre-
serves most conflicts from judicial inquiry.
The Bruch rule should have been narrowly tailored to Firestone
Tire's specific situation. Firestone had sold five plastics plants to Occi-
dental Petroleum Company, 96 and several employees who had been
working for Firestone were "rehired" by Occidental with no interruption
in their essential jobs.97 Firestone had maintained three unfunded 98 "em-
ployee welfare benefit plans"99 under ERISA, one of them a termination
94. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
95. See Langbein, supra note 61, at 211 (stating that reciprocity makes benefit plans arise as a
matter of contract law, not private trust law). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 8-10, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No.
87-1054), in which the Solicitor General urged the Court to use contract law as the ground for de
novo review. Contract law would interpret benefits plans as contracts bargained at arms' length.
Such bilateralism best achieved the twin ERISA goals of insulating benefit plans from employers'
interests and ensuring that employees who become eligible for benefits actually receive them.
96. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 520 (1989).
97. Id. at 521 (following the sale, plaintiffs and most of the other employees continued, without
interruption, to perform their same jobs at the same rates of pay as employees of the new owner,
Occidental).
98. Id. at 522.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2004).
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pay plan.100 When the employees sought severance pay from the termina-
tion plan after being hired by Occidental, Firestone claimed that the sale
of the plastics division did not constitute a "reduction in work force" as
defined in the plan document'0 and flatly refused to pay.
Where the tie between employee and employer is dissolving, as was
the case with Firestone, the same incentives employers have for fair deal-
ing are not present, opening the door to dual loyalties. The same safe-
guards 10 2 that would protect employees from conflicted employers are
not present with conflicted insurer-fiduciaries. 0 3 Disability claims are
like dissolving companies: If the employee is totally disabled, he is lost
to the employer, and employer incentives begin to drop out. The insurer-
fiduciary's interest is in retaining the employer as a client. Employers
recruit and retain employees with these benefits; if benefit plans do not
deliver as promised because the insurer-fiduciaries can interpret the plan
as they go, then the disability contract becomes one of adhesion. Such
blurred focus is detrimental indeed, as employees most need protection
from the conflict of interests that an insurer-fiduciary operates under as a
matter of course.
B. Abolition of Discretionary Terms
Now that we have seen how conflicts of interest are hidden from a
reviewing court in an abuse of discretion analysis, we can begin to ap-
preciate what the California Insurance Commissioner is doing by ban-
ning disability contracts that contain terms that confer discretion. If dis-
ability insurance contracts are stripped of discretionary language, a strict
reading of Bruch would call for de novo review because abuse of discre-
tion review is available only for fiduciaries operating under a textual
grant of discretion. Without the boilerplate, fiduciaries are cut off from
their font of discretion; thus, standard of review determinations will be-
come more of a fight for fiduciaries. Because employers, acting as
settlors under trust law, confer discretionary power on insurer-
fiduciaries, these insurer-fiduciaries will naturally argue to maintain the
abuse of discretion standard of review. A federal court can then make a
factual determination outside the record and will take into consideration
whether the first factor of Comment d has been met. Under California
100. Bruch, 640 F. Supp. at 521.
101. Id. at 525.
102. Such as an employer's reputational interest, union monitoring, and costliness of judicial
review as a substitute for routine deference. See Langbein & Fischel, supra note 90, at 1132.
103. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 2000) (employer
incentives missing when insurer is fiduciary).
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law, a court could find that this first factor has not been met because the
terms of the trust will not have conferred discretion to any "extent" at all.
To go from a protected abuse of discretion review to de novo just
because often to twenty words of boilerplate seems harshly formal and is
but one of the questionable ways a fiduciary can get discretion; back-
ground trust principles already operate without the limitations of textual
grants of discretion, so the boilerplate is arguably extraneous. The Bruch
analysis is an unnecessary analysis, and does not change the result. If
discretionary language is in the plan document, the fiduciary is evaluated
for abuse of his discretion, just as if he had followed the background law
of trusts where discretionary power is the default (and where a conflict
and a textual grant would be evaluated as independent factors). Now, to
get that same abuse of discretion review, the fiduciary has to be sure to
draft it in the boilerplate. The boilerplate does not cure the conflict, how-
ever, and a lack of boilerplate will not work against the non-conflicted
fiduciary. Additionally, if the boilerplate confers discretion, conflicts
likely will not be weighed properly because they cannot be properly ex-
amined if the inquiry is confined to the record.
If discretionary language is widely abolished by states, and if Bruch
is gutted of significance and exposed as an unnecessary decision that
prevents a clear view of trust law from developing in ERISA doctrine,
conflicts of interest will resurface as factors demanding renewed consid-
eration by courts. A clear view of trust law would have required a larger
role for a conflict of interest analysis in the standard of review determi-
nation. The outlawing of discretionary terms in ERISA disability plans
funded and administered by insurance companies exposes Bruch as in-
adequate and reorients ERISA jurisprudence toward a rigorous conflict
of interest approach. The approach that should be applied is that of the
Ninth Circuit. For conflicts involving insurer-fiduciaries, the Ninth Cir-
cuit approach exposes conflicts best and at the lowest cost.
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES
A. How the Ninth Circuit Treats Conflicts of Interest
All the circuits have adjusted Bruch's simple distinction between de
novo review and abuse of discretion review when a conflict is in-
volved.1°4 The result of a conflict of interest ranges from making the fi-
104. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1153-62 (surveying adjustments to the standard of re-
view).
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duciary's decision presumptively void,' °5 to being evidence of bias, 10 6 to
requiring a "more bite" analysis, 10 7 to being a "smoking gun,"',0 8 to a
sliding scale analysis,'09 to creating a burden shift to the administrator," 0
or to establishing a "neutral" presumption.'" The Bruch Court, however,
held that a conflict of interest was to be weighed as only a factor in de-
termining whether there was an abuse of discretion. Under Bruch, courts
are not allowed to review conflicted fiduciaries' decisions de novo if the
plan gives the fiduciary discretion, even in the face of the conflict." 2 Un-
105. See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that ac-
tions taken by a trustee in violation of a fiduciary duty are presumptively void); see also Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1568-"8 (11 th Cir. 1990).
106. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323.
107. Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
108. Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1259 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. See Elliott v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 605 (4th Cir. 1999).
110. In Fought v. Unum Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 357 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2004), vacatedon reh'g,
379 F.3d 997, 1007 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit improved upon the sliding scale standard by
using a burden shift to mark a point along a sliding scale under an arbitrary and capricious analysis.
In this analysis, if the plaintiff can prove a conflict, or if the insurer and administrator are one and
the same, or if there is a serious procedural irregularity, an additional reduction in deference is due.
Id. at 1007 This additional reduction manifests itself as a burden upon the administrator to prove that
its decision to deny benefits was both reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1014.
Note that the burden is not on the administrator to rebut the conflict of interest (as in the Ninth Cir-
cuit), but once the plaintiff has shown a "serious" conflict, the administrator has to show a reason-
able decision based on substantial evidence.
The burden shift to the administrator is the simplest and most straightforward way to deal with
conflicts. It comports with ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2004), on prohibited transactions. Further-
more, the substantial evidence standard in this decision, on petition for rehearing, was a cutback on
the language in the initial Court of Appeals case, 357 F.3d 1173, which would have required the
administrator to use a preponderance of evidence to support its decision. 379 F.3d at 1007. That
preponderance standard would have replaced the substantial evidence standard and moved ERISA
claims adjudication further away from an administrative law model. Nonetheless, the rehearing
decision in Fought left the core intact: A conflicted third-party insurer has to justify its decision by
substantial evidence in order to retain the deferential standard of review. Id. at 1006. Yet does it
really matter? The Tenth Circuit, using the substantial evidence standard, reached the same result as
the district court did using the preponderance standard. So it is still difficult to say how much defer-
ence is too much. Finally, it is not clear whether this burden shift should apply to all insured plans,
or just circumstances involving policy limitations or exclusions.
111. See Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (fiduciary acts neutrally unless a claimant shows by "specific evidence of
actual bias that there is a significant conflict"); Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Dis-
ability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 2000) (although the insurer-administrator stands in a
conflicted position, it is "unsound" to impute to first-level administrative decisionmaker such con-
flicted position).
112. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Note that the mere
existence of a conflict of interest does not change the standard of review, but rather determines
whether there has been an abuse of discretion under the abuse of discretion standard. This is an
important distinction that is easy to miss and one that some would say the lower federal courts since
Bruch have missed in their conflict of interest formulations. A conflict of interest does not, for the
Bruch Court, invoke the de novo standard. Id. at 115. Only a lack of a grant of discretionary author-
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der Bruch, there are only two standards of review: de novo and abuse of
discretion. Bruch establishes that conflicts of interest only play a part in
determining whether there has been an actual abuse of discretion." 13 In
every circuit but the Ninth and the Eleventh, when a court finds a con-
flict, the fiduciary's decision gets neither de novo nor abuse of discretion
review, but something in between. 14
The rule in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits preserves the simple
distinction between de novo and abuse of discretion without taking a"sliding scale" approach, but finds the conflict of interest, if there is one,
as determinative of the standard of review."15 Both these circuits focus on
the conflict, not on the terms in the plan document.
The Ninth Circuit takes a stricter approach than the Eleventh Cir-
cuit by hewing more to the letter of Bruch. Under the Ninth Circuit's
trust law approach, any denial by a conflicted fiduciary is treated as a
violation of fiduciary responsibilities and is thus void.' 16 If the decision is
void, there is no point deferring to it. 117 The Ninth Circuit requires the
plaintiff to come forward with "material, probative evidence" of a con-
flict before it will shift the burden to the fiduciary. 1 8 If the evidence
tends to show that the fiduciary's self-interest caused a breach of fiduci-
ary obligation to the beneficiary, then a rebuttable presumption arises
that the fiduciary did breach its obligation. 19 If the fiduciary cannot rebut
the presumption by producing evidence showing that the conflict, while
present, did not affect its decision, then an actual conflict of interest
ity in the plan document invokes de novo review. Id.; see also Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleged conflict does not change the standard of review).
113. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
114. The circuits decide the existence of a conflict of interest in different ways. The First,
Second, and Seventh Circuits require that the plaintiff prove an actual conflict of interest before the
court will adjust the standard of review. See, e.g., Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442
(2d Cir. 1995) (even after a conflict of interest is shown, it is only a factor to be considered in modi-
fying the standard of review, and even then, the plaintiff has to show that the conflict of interest
affected the reasonableness of the decision).
115. See, e.g., Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995); Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
116. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322-23.
117. See id.
118. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d
794, 798 (9th Cir. 1997) (when plaintiff has presented "material, probative evidence, beyond the
mere fact of the apparent conflict, tending to show that the fiduciary's self interest caused a breach
of the administrator's fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary," the court will give less deferential
review). Examples of material, probative evidence include a change of the plan administrator's posi-
tion with no new evidence to support that change, id., or bias, bad faith, or personal motivation on
the part of the administrator. LaPrease v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2004 WL 2800954, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 2, 2004).
119. Tremain v. Bell Industries, Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999).
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arises, and judicial review of the decision is de novo.12 So long as the
conflicted fiduciary can show that its decision was free from an actual
conflict of interest, the Ninth Circuit will not invoke the de novo stan-
dard, even if the plaintiff can shift its burden.
The conflicted fiduciary can relatively simply rebut the presump-
tion of a conflict of interest by showing that it was operating in the best
interests of the beneficiaries by, for example, showing that to not deny
benefits in a disputed case would have unnecessarily depleted resources
for other plan participants. 121 If the fiduciary can carry its burden, the
court will apply the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than the de
novo standard. 122 This does not mean that a court could not ultimately
conclude that the fiduciary acted arbitrarily and capriciously, but such
actions could have been for reasons other than the influence of the con-
flict on the fiduciary's decision. Only if the fiduciary cannot carry its
burden or did not include administrative discretion in the plan will a
court engage in de novo review.
B. Critical Differences Between Bruch and the Ninth Circuit
Under Bruch, a conflict is relevant only to determining whether an
abuse of discretion has occurred, a notable divergence from the Ninth
Circuit. Unlike Bruch, the Ninth Circuit's approach meets the problem of
conflicts of interest head on: If the conflict of interest tainted the decision
to deny benefits, and the defendant could not prove that it did not taint it,
then the decision is reviewed de novo. 123 Because a conflict of interest is
the default under Bruch, the Bruch rule makes it irrelevant to de novo
review entirely.
Analytically, the bit of boilerplate is no longer dispositive in the
Ninth Circuit; instead, the fiduciary's conflict is dispositive. The conflict
has gone beyond being a factor in determining abuse of discretion to be-
ing instead a factor in determining de novo review. In an abuse of discre-
tion review, even a conflicted fiduciary still has discretion, but the in-
quiry is always to the abuse of discretion arising from the fiduciary's
self-interest. The Ninth Circuit's rule, however, provides the maximum
protection for ERISA beneficiaries when the insurer-fiduciary is unmind-
ful of beneficiaries' interests.
120. Id.
121. See Lang, 125 F.3d at 798. Note the protection of the corpus as the reason to deny bene-
fits-a distinctly trust law approach.
122. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1567 (11th Cir. 1990).
123. Obviously, the relevance of the conflict can go beyond standard of review to the merits if
the conflict taints the entire claim review process. But that is analytically separate from the function
of the conflict in determining the standard of review.
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Whether viewed through the lens of de novo review or abuse of
discretion review, the ultimate decision for the judge remains centered on
how grievously the conflicted fiduciary in question really acted. Disabil-
ity and health care claimants already suffer from a lengthy and inexpert
administrative review process. The disabled are often without income
and are counting on monies paid on their disability insurance contract.
Delayed health care claims can mean the difference between life and
death. The federal courts need a rule that actually facilitates the judicial
review process; because de novo review allows more evidence of a con-
flict of interest with an insurer-fiduciary, de novo review is of paramount
concern. Additionally, because conflicts of interest among insurer-
fiduciaries are the ones employees most need protection against, more
effective review not only makes sense but is necessary.
The Ninth Circuit rule does the best job of consciously setting the
standard of review to best protect the interests of beneficiaries who are
being evaluated by a conflicted fiduciary. To best effectuate this review,
the Ninth Circuit has created a "presumptively void" rule for managing
conflicts and has implemented broad discovery rules in de novo review.
Such a progressive stance is enviable as we head toward the future be-
cause the Supreme Court has generally avoided conflicts analysis.
C. Supreme Court Treatment of Conflicts of Interest
To illustrate how unwilling the Supreme Court is to demystify con-
flicts of interest, consider the Court's stance in The Black & Decker Dis-
ability Plan v. Nord. The issue was whether an ERISA fiduciary should
accord special weight or deference to the opinions of a disability claim-
ant's treating physician. 124
124. The Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003). The treating
physician rule developed initially in the Social Security Administration context. See James A. Mac-
caro, The Treating Physician Rule and the Adjudication of Claims for Social Security Disability
Benefits, 41 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV., 833, 833-34 (1993). Administrative law judges ("ALJs") used
the rule to determine the fact of disability when a claimant's treating physician submitted evidence.
In those cases, the treating physician's opinion was granted greater weight in the adjudicative proc-
ess. See, e.g., Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1139
(2001). The treating physician rule does not simply give deference to the plaitiff's doctor-deference
is only given if the doctor is a specialist and gives an opinion consistent with the objective test re-
sults and the record as a whole. The rationale was that the treating physician knew the claimant
better and could make a more accurate determination of the claimant's disability. This grant of def-
erence to the treating physician thus forced the ALJ who rejected the treating physician's opinions to
come forward with substantial evidence from the medical record, see Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d
894, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that substantial evidence as a "quantified reformation of
reasonableness"), as to why the ALJ was rejecting the treating physician's opinion. Regula, 266 F.3d
at 1139. In Regula, the court noted that the grant of deference to the treating physician was a
theoretical move that invoked the adversarial burden shifting coupled with the hoped-for result of
more accurate determinations. Id. The Nord Court rejected this move categorically by noting the
exceptional case of a treating physician who has begun care of the plaintiff only recently, or where a
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The treating physician rule was one of the myriad ways the circuits
were trying to find conflicts of interest. 125 Recall that, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the plaintiff has to produce "material, probative evidence" to shift
the burden to the conflicted fiduciary. The treating physician rule was
being used in the Ninth Circuit 2 6 and elsewhere 27 as that "material, pro-
bative evidence," evidence commonly employed by the plaintiff to show
a conflict of interest.' 28 When an employee makes a disability benefit
claim, he submits medical evidence, including his treating physician's
and other specialists' medical opinions and tests, to the plan administra-
tor. The administrator will often require the employee to be examined
either by the insurance company's own physician or by an independent
medical examiner ("IME"), usually a physician who contracts with the
insurance company. When the treating physician and the IME come to
different conclusions about the claimant's condition, the administrator
must determine the question of disability, even if he has a conflict of in-
terest.
In the circuits where it was being used, the treating physician rule
was trumping some of the Bruch-encouraged fiduciary discretion granted
in the plan document. Granting deference to such a nonfiduciary seems
to run contrary to the very idea of the fiduciary having discretion.
D. Demise of the Treating Physician Rule in ERISA Disability
Meditate for a moment on how minor the treating physician rule
was. It was one piece of evidence in the plaintiff's "material, probative
evidence" prong of a proof and production inquiry in a conflict of inter-
est analysis to determine the standard of review in a claim for denied
tional case of a treating physician who has begun care of the plaintiff only recently, or where a spe-
cialist engaged by the plan has expertise that the treating physician lacks. 538 U.S. at 832; see also
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2003) (ob-
serving that a treating physician's incentive of helping the claimant is offset when a private disability
insurer hires a medical consultant who has an incentive of saving the insurer money). The reason for
the treating physician rule in the Social Security context was to moderate the harsh effect of the
deferential standard of review of administrative decisions. That was the rationale behind Regula as
well.
125. In Regula, the Ninth Circuit stated the rule as follows:
When a nontreating physician's opinion contradicts that of the treating physician-but is
not based on independent clinical findings, or rests on clinical findings also considered by
the treating physician-the opinion of the treating physician may be rejected only if the
ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence
in the record.
266 F.3d at 1140 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1130.
127. See, e.g., Donaho, 74 F.3d at 901.
128. Nord v. The Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 28:467
ERISA Disability Plans
benefits. The Supreme Court was adjudicating in the doctrinal hinter-
lands in Nord.12
9
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Nord should have en-
compassed the conflict of interest issue 30 though the Court, it seems, did
not understand the treating physician rule or how it was being used in
Ninth Circuit conflict analyses. Given Ninth Circuit precedent, it would
have been useful for the Nord Court to have written some dicta, useful in
a signaling function, to give the lower federal courts some guidance on
conflicts of interest. ERISA plaintiffs' attorneys, sensitive to the admin-
istrative law paradigm that the federal courts function under with ERISA
benefit claims,' 31 simply sought to borrow a rule from the administrative
law world; though this is a tempting step to take in this position, its rami-
fications render it less than desirable. 132
It is clear that the Supreme Court is not interested in spending the
time to figure out conflicts of interest and will not likely decide the issue
soon enough. In the meantime, if state insurance commissioners and state
legislatures act to outlaw discretionary clauses and the standard of review
is de novo, the scope of a de novo review will become an issue. If a con-
flicted fiduciary can get abuse of discretion review by proving that its
conflict did not influence its denial decision, then scope of review should
properly be limited to the record; but if de novo review is in order, the
scope of that review should be as searching as necessary to find evidence
of a conflict.
VI. SCOPE OF REVIEW & DISCOVERY
It is well established that the scope of discovery in a denial of
ERISA benefits case is linked to the standard of review in the Ninth Cir-
129. Plaintiffs' counsel was anticipating that the Supreme Court would use the treating physi-
cian rule as a vehicle to deal with the conflict of interest issue left open after Bruch. E-mail from
Mark DeBofsky to the author, (Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with author). The federal courts were also
anticipating resolution on this issue. See, e.g., Wallace v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 318 F.3d
723, 724 (11 th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[c]ontentions that insurers deny claims to save money, and
that judicial review should be more searching as a result even when the plan or policy confers inter-
pretive discretion, are before the Supreme Court in Nord"). Such contentions have become manifest
in the Unum settlement.
130. Oral Arguments to U.S. Sup. Ct. in The Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S.
822 (Apr. 28, 2003). The Court's earliest and most earnest questions of each petitioner, respondent,
and amicus counsel were about the conflict of interest question, not the treating physician rule. At
one point in petitioner's argument one of the justices asked of the assembled, "Can we get back to
the question that you did raise?"
131. See, e.g., Mark DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 741 (2004).
132. See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
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cuit "'3 3 as well as other circuits. 34 When a court reviews a discretionary
decision, its review is based on the administrative record; discovery out-
side the record is not generally allowed. 135 To review a discretionary de-
cision by considering evidence outside the record opens the door to fidu-
ciary abuse because a fiduciary could easily fail to consider evidence not
before it. 136
On the other hand, there is no clear-cut authority on the ability to
conduct additional discovery if the standard of review is de novo. 137 Un-
der de novo review, some courts have allowed discovery to determine the
existence of an insurer's conflict of interest, 138 though others have not.
Still other courts will allow discovery for conflicts, but will disallow dis-
covery of documentation that would not directly relate to the decision
made in the claimant's claim for benefits. 139 Even courts that allow dis-
covery will generally not inquire into third-party relationships, such as
hired examiners 40 or consultants. 14
1
One of the main rationales behind limiting discovery in ERISA
cases is that review proceedings under ERISA are not adversarial, and
thus the kind of adversarial testing that wide-ranging discovery entails is
not appropriate to maintaining costs and fair and prompt resolution of
133. See, e.g., Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1145
(2001); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993).
134. Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82
(7th Cir. 1999) (citing cases from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 10th circuits to show that deferential
review means review only of the administrative record).
135. Taft, 9 F.3d at 1471.
136. Id.; see also Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
soundness of fiduciary's decision rises or falls with the evidence before him).
137. See, e.g., Perry, 900 F.2d at 963 (de novo review limited to the record that the fiduciary
used in making a determination, otherwise it would not be "review"); Moon v. Home Assurance, 888
F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989) (for de novo review, district court may hold evidentiary hearing, other-
wise the review is not "de novo" and would not protect plan participants). But cf Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds 944 F.2d 1176, 1185 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that, if evi-
dentiary record is fully developed, no evidentiary hearing is necessary).
138. Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 01 Civ. 9182 (CSH), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11789, at
* 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) (granting protective order). But see Brown v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., No. C-03-02466 RMW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5059, at *6 (N.D. Cal. January
16, 2004) (discovery not allowed, even to try to produce evidence of actual conflict of interest).
139. Waggener v. Unum, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185 (S.D. Cal 2002). But see Pulliam v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 02-0370, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10010, at *11, *20 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2003)
(discovery allowed into incentive-based compensation, education, and training of claims analysts);
Woodward v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 1:02cv64 MMP, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19206, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2003) (discovery allowed as to breach of fiduciary duties and proper proce-
dure).
140. Abram v. Cargill, Inc., No. 01-CV-1656, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7027, at *11 (D. Minn.
Feb. 10, 2003) (allowing deposition of examiner hired by insurer would go against the very purpose
of"limited ERISA review").
141. Abromitis v. Cont'l Cas.. Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (disallowing
discovery of the financial relationship between a consultant and an insurer).
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claims.1 42 The Unum settlement shows, however, that disability claims
should be adversarial to protect beneficiaries' interests; discovery under
de novo review should thus be as broad as necessary to find a conflict of
interest with an insurer-fiduciary.
VII. CONCLUSION
ERISA protects the interests of employees who participate in em-
ployer-sponsored plans.143 In ERISA's purpose section, 144 Congress fo-
cused the statute specifically on the interests of employees.1 45 For exam-
ple, § 1001 references the need for "adequate safeguards,' 46 for better
protection of the "interests of employees"1 47 and the "interests of partici-
pants in employee benefit plans,"1 48 for better protection of "plan partici-
pants,"'149 and for the "guarantee of employee benefits,"'' 5 among oth-
ers. 15 1
Unfortunately, however, instead of protecting plan participants,
ERISA doctrine has developed into a quasi-administrative law model
where a "full and fair review" is promised,152 yet that is not possible be-
cause ERISA allows conflicted fiduciaries. Furthermore, the so-called
administrative record is limited to what the conflicted fiduciary allows
into the record, and there is no opportunity to call or cross-examine wit-
nesses. 53 For a federal law that operates with administrative law-like
142. See Waggener, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
143. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2004):
The Congress finds that ... the continued well-being and security of millions of employ-
ees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans ... that owing to the lack of
employee information and adequate safeguards concerning [plan] operation it is desirable
in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries ... that ... safeguards be provided..
Id. The introductory sections of ERISA, §§ 1001-1001(b), are replete with references to the interests








151. See §§ 1001-1001b.
152. § 1133.
153. See DeBofsky, supra note 131, at 738 (highlighting the procedural protections ERISA
claimants are denied); see also Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds 944
F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit had the following to say about plan administrators:
Plan administrators are not governmental agencies who are frequently granted deferential
review because of their acknowledged expertise. Administrators may be laypersons ap-
pointed under the plan, sometimes without any legal, accounting, or other training prepar-
ing them for their responsible position, often without any experience in or understanding
of the complex problems arising under ERISA ....
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procedures, one would expect ERISA's procedures to be governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act. 54 Because ERISA specially stresses that"safeguards be provided with respect to the . . . administration" of
ERISA plans, it is notably troubling that no such safeguards are en-
forced. 155
Neutral fiduciaries have nothing to fear from a de novo review; de
novo review only threatens conflicted fiduciaries who want to prevent a
de novo review outside the record. Destructive practices such as Unum's
will likely remain in the dark at the district court level unless scrutinized
under a more searching standard, and the time for change is now. If more
states eliminate discretionary clauses, litigation will likely increase as
existing parties to disability policies deal with newly invalidated lan-
guage,156 giving rise to a dual-layered litigation: first from state insurance
commissioners, second from aggrieved beneficiaries. Insurers who find
this process overly burdensome may pull out of less profitable disability
markets, such as those occupied by small- and medium-sized employers,
leaving these employers to self-fund or not fund at all. This kind of event
would be contrary to the ERISA goal that more employers establish
Id. at 1183.
154. See DeBofsky, supra note 153, at 738.
155. If the Bruch Court was really serious about an administrative law approach, it would have
looked at the lack of procedural safeguards and granted de novo review based on that, rather than the
lack of discretionary language in the plan.
156. See Horn v. Provident Life & Accident Assurance Co., No. C 04-0589 MHP, 2004 WL
2862332, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2004) (a discretionary clause had not been approved in a disabil-
ity insurance contract, rendering the policy only voidable at the option of the policy-holding plain-
tiff. Thus, the plaintiff could either rescind the policy or seek to have it voided on public policy
grounds. The court pointed to the fact that the California Insurance Commissioner, in his opinion
letter, reasoned that discretionary clauses rendered the insurance contract unclear and misleading
under CAL. INS. CODE § 10291.5(b)(1) (2005). According to the Commissioner, if the clauses render
the contract unclear and misleading, then a beneficiary might conclude that the determination was
final when it was not. However, the paragraph in which the clause was found begins with the words,
"if the Member is not satisfied or does not agree with the reasons for denial of the claim, the Mem-
ber may appeal the decision to the Claims Fiduciary," thus undercutting the Commissioner's argu-
ment about unclear and misleading language). See also Firestone v. Acuson Corp. Long Term Dis-
ability Plan, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1050-51 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (where defendant insurance com-
pany's disability policy was not among those disapproved by the Commissioner, plaintiffs only
remedy is writ of mandamus compelling Commissioner to withdraw her approval); Hansen v. Unum
Life Insur. Co. of Am., No. CIV-S-03-1230 FCD PAN, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22995, at *20 n.6
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2004) (even though defendant insurance company's disability policy was among
those disapproved by the Commissioner, the disapproval operates only prospectively); Washington
v. Standard Insur. Co., No. C-03-4287 MMC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22975, at *50-51 (N.D. Cal.
July 27, 2004) (defendant insurance company's disability policy was not among those disapproved
by the Commissioner, but even if it was, disapproval of the policy would operate only prospec-
tively). But see Fenberg v. Cowden Auto. Long Term Disability Plan, No. C 03-03898 S12004, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22927, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2004) (with no discussion of whether defendant
insurer's policy was among those disapproved, the discretionary clause was invalid based on the
persuasiveness of Commissioner's opinion letter).
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plans for their employees, and troubling for employees who have bar-
gained for this kind of benefit as a condition to employment.
Ultimately, from a policy standpoint, it makes very little sense to
allow for-profit insurers to have discretion. Recall the quotation from
Judge Posner that began this article. He was not as generous about an
employer's reputational interest as I have been, and he does not agree
that they should get as much deference as they do. It is even less reason-
able to allow insurer-fiduciaries to have the discretion they do unless
they are willing to respect employee interests and not be so focused on
cost containment.
